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This review attempts to identify treatments of corruption that draw upon charac-
teristics of underdevelopment either as causes or as consequences. It focuses on three
aspects of corruption in developing economies: red tape, rent-seeking, and the abun-
dance of intermediaries. Red tape is presented as arising from diﬀerences in ability-
to-pay and willingness-to-pay, which is a consequence of incomplete or absent markets
in LDCs. Rent-seeking is viewed as a reason for ineﬃcient allocation of resources. We
emphasise that there is very little analysis of intermediation, but analysis is necessary
to understand the structure of corruption markets.
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11 Introduction
Corruption is as old as government. Observations of contemporary commentators on
corruption in civilisations ancient and modern have been liberally cited in the re-
cent literature. The focus on corruption in contemporary economics dates from Rose-
Ackerman’s 1975 paper (see also Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
remains a particularly inﬂuential contribution, as is the survey by Bardhan (1997).
Several substantial books and edited volumes have appeared on the subject, including
Klitgaard (1988), Rose-Ackerman (1999, 2007), and Abed and Gupta (2002). Interna-
tional bodies including the World Bank have over these decades laid increasing empha-
sis on corruption as one of the primary forces retarding development in the developing
world.
Most Indians are intimately familiar with corruption in the news as well as in
personal transactions. Anecdotes, indicators and evidence abound both in the popular
press and in academic writing, whether of economists or other social scientists, as well
as in contemporary literature and ﬁlm. Indeed, a prototype of the popular hero in old
Bombay movies is the police oﬃcer that is not corrupt, and therefore stands out from
the crowd (e.g., Amitabh Bachhan in Zanjeer, or Sanjeev Kumar in Sholay). Outside
the movies, bribes have to be paid by the common man to obtain a driver’s license or
a building completion certiﬁcate, while the uncommon one may rake in millions from
manipulating the award of a public contract.
Several deﬁnitions of corruption have been oﬀered. There are diﬀerences in detail,
nuance, and emphasis in the ways that various authors conceive corruption, but not
severe disagreements of substance. The recent literature contains several discussions
of the appropriateness of alternative deﬁnitions. I will sidestep that conversation, and
adopt the deﬁnition that corruption happens when a government oﬃcial (“bureau-
crat”) breaks the rules of his oﬃce to obtain a private gain (Banerjee, Hanna, and
Mullianathan, 2009). Our speciﬁc concern is with situations where the oﬃcial alters
the terms of a transaction with a private individual in which he acts on behalf of the
government. The alteration in terms constitutes the deviation from rules and beneﬁts
the individual, who pays a consideration to the oﬃcial in return. The consideration
may be in kind, such as a favour in return, or the acknowledgement that the bureaucrat
has discharged a parochial obligation.
The context of corruption is thus a transaction in which the government is in-
volved, represented by a bureaucrat. One way to eliminate corruption, therefore, is for
the government not to be involved in the corresponding transactions. This is clearly
a non-starter in the case of goods and services that require state involvement to pre-
serve their nature (such as law-enforcement and justice), and diﬃcult with others that
possess characteristics of non-exclusivity or give rise to signiﬁcant externalities. We
now do know however that many operations in which government participation was
previously thought to be necessary (such as natural monopolies with extensive network
eﬀects) can in fact be eﬀectively privatised using sophisticated mechanism design prin-
ciples and regulatory devices. When corruption is a serious problem, such alternative
solutions must ﬁrst be explored. If privatising the activity generates greater net welfare
than under second-best government operation with corruption, then it is the optimal
solution. I have discussed this further in Section 3.1. There are papers in the literature
2that analyse corruption, and mechanisms to reduce it, in situations where privatisa-
tion is the obvious answer. The focus of the literature is probably better placed upon
situations where it is not.
That still leaves a large array of activities that governments must participate in,
and where corruption remains a persistent problem. This essay addresses only a narrow
slice it. We focus on transactions that occur between a bureaucrat and a member of
the public, either directly or as mediated by a professional who specialises in arranging
corrupt transactions. In particular we do not primarily address optimal punishment
schemes (see Mookherjee and Png, 1995, and related contributions) or corruption in
hierarchical structures (see Mishra, 2007, for a recent survey). The survey by Aidt
(2003) covers ground similar to this essay, but uses a diﬀerent conceptual organisation.
In addition there are sections of macroeconomic literature that study the conjunction of
corruption and growth (Mauro, 1995), corruption and foreign aid (Neeman, Paserman,
and Simhon, 2008; Alesina and Weder, 2002) etc., which we abstract from altogether.
A second consideration in the study of corruption is that, while it is not unknown
in the developed world, it is a nagging and everyday problem prominently in the de-
veloping (and not-so-developing) world. Since our concern is with this context, it
seems reasonable to position the study of corruption with reference to salient char-
acteristics of underdevelopment. Focus on attributes such as poverty, inequality and
severely incomplete markets have in recent decades yielded rich dividends in under-
standing the genesis and dynamics (or stasis) of underdevelopment. In that vein, it
may be productive to ask how characteristics of underdevelopment can create occasions
for corruption—especially the varieties that are rife in less-developed economies—and
how corruption may lead to sluggish development or the lack of even that. Section 2
brieﬂy discusses some of the literature relevant to this question. The suggestion is that
our analytical understanding of this nexus is still incomplete. I have indicated at least
one correlate of corruption that may be especially relevant in the Indian context, and
has not yet been extensively studied.
The emphasis of this essay, however, is on microeconomic treatments of two salient
aspects of corruption. Section 3 formally analyses the familiar phenomenon of red
tape. It focuses on a scenario in which credit constraints (in the background) drive
a wedge between citizens’ willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay for a service, and thus
create the need for government involvement in its distribution. It is this wedge that
also produces the need to institute red tape as a screening device for recipients of the
service, and gives rise to a speciﬁcally recognisable attribute of state engagement and
corruption in developing economies. Section 4, which nominally addresses rent-seeking
behaviour, in large part turns its attention to corruption which results in drawing away
resources from productive to unproductive activities.
Section 5 addresses a salient aspect of the industrial organisation of the corruption
market: the fact that most corruption activities are organised and channeled through
established and professional intermediaries. We know from experience that eﬀective
regulation of an activity requires an understanding of how the market is organised;
we also know that intermediaries are ubiquitous in arranging corrupt transactions in
the developing world (as well as in the developed—see Lambsdorﬀ (2002) for several
case studies), and yet there is little analytical attention that has been paid to this
phenomenon. The section reviews some of the surprisingly thin literature there is, and
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developed countries may also be sought in familiar economic characteristics of these
countries.
The general emphasis of this essay is that the study of corruption should iden-
tify sectors in which privatisation is not a solution for corruption, and there explore
links between essential attributes of underdevelopment and corruption. Further the
organisational structure of corruption markets must be paid greater attention, and the
genesis and consequences of established intermediation better understood.
2 Corruption and development
Cursory observation readily conﬁrm that corruption in its everyday bureaucratic trans-
actions is more pervasive in the less-developed countries than in developed ones, a
relationship that also emerges strongly from empirical analysis (see Treisman, 2000).
Following the work of Mauro (1995) it is also generally accepted that corruption is
associated with slower growth. Bardhan (1997) observes that “over the last 100 years
or so corruption has generally declined with economic growth in most rich countries”
(p.1329).1 Neeman, Paserman, and Simhon (2008) ﬁnd that the relationship between
corruption and GNP per capita is conditioned by the openness of the economy; in open
economies the relationship is decidedly negative, but in closed economies there is no
clear relationship between the two.
In recent decades there have been several attempts to unravel the causal relation-
ships that may link corruption, underdevelopment and the growth process. Mauro
(1998) argues that “predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition
of government expenditure” into channels from which it is easier to extract rents, and
ﬁnds that empirically corruption reduces expenditure on education. Murphy, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1993) show that when property rights are weak and rent-seeking is a vi-
able option, resources will be channeled out of productive activities into rent-seeking.
Despite these and other attempts, however, the literature is far from providing a com-
prehensive theory that relates corruption and development.
Following Becker and Stigler (1974), one would expect that corruption would be
lower when bureaucrats draw higher salaries and face greater likelihood of losing
salaried positions if they are caught taking bribes. Treisman (2000) ﬁnds weak evi-
dence that high salaries associate with lower corruption. Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)
do ﬁnd some support for the hypothesis, but conclude that it would take very large
increases in salaries to eliminate corruption. There are well-known cases where corrup-
tion has been drastically reduced in a short time by improving vigilance and weakening
the ability of bureaucrats to establish long-term relationships with potential clients.
Analyses of such successful anti-corruption eﬀorts in the Philippines income-tax sys-
tem and the Hong Kong police force, for example, can be found in the classic study by
Klitgaard (1988).
If remedies that are in the nature of a “big push” are successful, then it is possible
that the initial malaise was a bad draw from a set of multiple coordination equilibria.
An equilibrium with corruption is then the result of a historical accident; a country that
ﬁnds itself in such an equilibrium could have, under an alternate history, alighted in
a no-corruption equilibrium. Nabin and Bose (2008) provide a model which possesses
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countries are corrupt, then this explanation must be considered incomplete at best.
One possibility is that both the level of corruption and the extent and trajectory
of development are simultaneously co-determined by salient historical factors. Thus
Treisman (2000) ﬁnds that countries with Protestant traditions and histories of British
colonial rule are likely to be less corrupt, and long exposure to democracy is associated
with less corruption. More developed countries (measured by GDP per capita) are less
corrupt, and a federal structure predicts somewhat greater corruption than a unitary
one.
In a diﬀerent investigation, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) ﬁnd that, in
formerly colonial economies, the rise of development-friendly institutions is associated
with the mortality rates of early European colonisers; Europeans formed settler colonies
in the countries with lower mortality rates, and these economies developed suitable
institutions that in turn predicted higher per capita GDPs.2
Distant history cannot be readily altered by contemporary policy. It is of greater
interest to know if there are near-term measures that can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the level
of corruption. Studies bear out the immediate intuition that more government inter-
vention, an extensive regulatory structure and restricted competition correlate with
greater corruption (Tanzi, 1994; Ades and Tella, 1999). It is widely agreed, for in-
stance, that the continuing reduction in industrial and commercial regulations that
has taken place in India over the past two decades has brought in its wake a signiﬁcant
fall in the incidence of corruption.
Perhaps of greater interest is the relation between corruption, press freedom and
the availability of information. when oﬃcial complaints are cumbersome and costly, a
free press provides an alternative channel for citizens to draw attention to, and seek
redress from, extortive practices of the bureaucracy. Even when corruption occurs
in collusive agreements between a citizen (or ﬁrm) and a bureaucrat, journalists have
professional incentives to uncover such deals. In an econometric study of 125 countries,
Brunetti and Weder (2003) ﬁnd a strong association between increasing press freedom
and decreasing levels of corruption. They conclude that “an independent press may
represent an important check against corruption.”3
A more fundamental way in which information impacts upon corruption is by mak-
ing it possible for members of the public to assess the exact nature of rules and regu-
lations they are subject to, the services they are entitled to receive, and the extent to
which these are dispensed evenly and without prejudice.4 This is brought into sharp
relief by a ﬁeld experiment conducted by Pandey, Sehgal, Riboud, Levine, and Goyal
(2007) among a population of primarily poor rural subjects in Uttar Pradesh. The
researchers conducted information sessions in a number of village clusters to provide
information about legitimate levels of school fees and entitlements to prenatal and
child health services. Individuals in these villages were surveyed before the treatment
as well as a year after the treatment to observe the rates at which they accessed the
corresponding services. A parallel (control) set of village clusters, in which information
sessions had not been conducted, were also similarly surveyed. The surveys found that,
while there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in access rates between the treatment and the
control villages before the treatment, utilisation of prenatal care and immunisation
services were signiﬁcantly higher in the treatment villages a year after the information
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two sets paid school fees in excess of the government-mandated levels (the informed
villages paid less excess fees). The authors conclude that “Interventions that emphasize
educating resource-poor populations about entitled services may improve the delivery
of such services.”
What light do these investigations shed on corruption in India? India is squarely
placed in the British colonial tradition, and derives much of its legal and administrative
structure from that tradition. Among the less-developed countries, India arguably has
the oldest and most robust democracy, and a ﬁercely free press. Yet among the 99
countries ranked by Transparency International in 1999, India squeaks in at 72nd. By
2009, 180 countries are ranked and India is in 84th place. However, of the 95 countries
that are ranked in both surveys, we ﬁnd that India has improved its position from
70th in 1999 to 59th in 2009, and there is a marginal improvement in the (subjectively
determined) corruption score. In the decade between the two surveys, India’s GDP has
grown at a startling pace, the economy has become remarkably more open, real wages of
public oﬃcials have improved signiﬁcantly, and there has been a substantial reduction
in regulations and procedural inconveniences. Does this suggest that corruption slows
down growth, or is it growth that leads to a reduction in corruption? And what then
is the status of the institutional correlates stressed by Acemoglu and his coauthors
and by Treisman, as well as the various other variables invoked by the authors of the
several studies referred to above?
These are not questions that are otherwise settled, nor can they be answered within
the context of a single country. However, focus on a single country permits the luxury
of attention to peculiarities, which is an indulgence cross-sectional analysis cannot ac-
commodate. Further, it is commonplace that India is an unusual example of a “single
country”, woven as it is of innumerable diversities. In a recent paper, Kingston (2005)
argues that a society cleft by parochial allegiances may be able to sustain corruption
that is not readily remedied by legal and electoral action. In his formulation, a bu-
reaucrat dispenses corrupt services to his client-kinsmen in return for services that
are rendered to him in other spheres of social interaction.5 However, it is diﬃcult or
impossible to remove such a corrupt bureaucrat from oﬃce because his constituency–
consisting of members of his own group as well as others–is never united in denouncing
him. Kingston looks for support in an empirical analysis of bureaucratic transfers; he
argues that transfers are more common in states that are less riven by diﬀerences of
caste and language, which may indicate that concerted social action against corrupt
oﬃcials is more successful in these states.
The consequence of caste divisions on corruption cannot be tested in cross-country
studies, but some of the macro analyses we encountered above do incorporate a similar
variable: ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Indeed, Mauro uses ethno-linguistic frag-
mentation (ELF) as an instrument for corruption to avoid problems of endogeneity
between corruption and growth. ELF is clearly an exogenous variable, and Mauro
ﬁnds that it is highly correlated with corruption. Treisman also includes ELF as an
explanatory variable for corruption in his regressions. He ﬁnds that ELF is positive
and highly signiﬁcant in explaining corruption if GDP per capita is not included among
the independent variables, but drops to insigniﬁcance and becomes marginally nega-
tive when GDP per capita is included. While both authors have good reasons to draw
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allegiances in the genesis of corruption have not been suﬃciently illuminated in exist-
ing research. Especially in the context of India, where ethnic and linguistic divisions
are only a small fraction of factors that fragment the country, investigations in this
direction may be especially fruitful.
3R e d t a p e
I use the term “red tape” to denote any non-pecuniary costs that are imposed on
the agent in the process of applying for a service. In some cases, red tape is part of
the oﬃcial procedure for obtaining the service, and hence exogenously built in to the
system. In other cases it is endogenously imposed by the bureaucrat in order to elicit
bribe income. The actual amount of red tape in a given instance may, of course, be
jointly determined by the two imperatives.
Red tape may purely be a waste of time which occurs as a consequence of insuf-
ﬁciently resourced government oﬃces or ineﬃcient regulation, or as a result of rent-
seeking by bureaucrats. Alternatively, it may be a necessary part of the process, as
when an agent is required to provide various kinds of information and documentation
to prove that he is qualiﬁed to receive the service, and consequently needs to ﬁll out
many forms. Such screening is unavoidable in the case of publicly funded medical ser-
vices, academic merit scholarships or university places, awards of driving licenses, etc.
Bureaucrats may similarly use red tape to screen for potential payers of bribes.
We will primarily focus on situations in which red tape is used to resolve conﬂicts
arising from a discrepancy between ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay on the part of
an agent. An alternative rationale exists for the use of red tape in situations where the
social beneﬁt of allocating to diﬀerent categories of agents diverges from their private
beneﬁts. We will not discuss this latter case in detail, bar a reference at the end
of this section. Academic scholarships provide an example of the former problem and
driving licenses of the latter. In subsection 3.1 we provide arguments why, absent these
diﬀerences, red tape may be eliminated and allocation made eﬃcient by privatising the
distribution of the service. In the following section we discuss cases where ability-to-pay
falls short of willingness-to-pay.
In the analysis below, corruption nominally takes the form of a cash (bribe) pay-
ment. However, a payment in kind would not in any way alter the conclusions. Indeed,
in the Indian context, petty corruption most familiarly works through “connections”.
In order to obtain a government service eﬃciently, an individual accesses a bureaucrat
whom he knows personally, or goes through the good oﬃces of someone who knows
the bureaucrat. Personal acquaintance or a parochial relationship carries with it a
traditional obligation of reciprocal favours. In order to remain in good standing within
his community and access favours from others, a bureaucrat must be seen to dispense
corresponding favours that are within his power to grant. Bypassing red tape to pro-
vide a service eﬃcaciously is a favour that should be valued as equal to the bribe that
would have to be paid in the absence of the “connection”. Kingston (2005) (discussed
in Section 2) provides a model of this kind of corruption. Bardhan (1997) notes:
It is widely recognized that in developing countries gift-exchange is a major
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based loyalties often takes precedence over public duties even for salaried
public oﬃcials. Under such circumstances use of public resources to cater
to particularistic loyalties become quite common and routinely expected.
3.1 Red tape as pure waste
Starting with Leﬀ (1964) and Huntingdon (1968), it has been recognised that corruption
may be eﬃcient in a second-best sense if the underlying bureaucratic processes are ill-
designed and ineﬃcient. This is the “grease-in-the-wheels” view; the bureaucrat works
harder to cut through unproductive delays and deliver the service to the applicant,
who pays him a piece-rate bribe in return. Aidt (2003) has an extended discussion and
further references.
However, corruption increases eﬃciency only if the red tape is exogenous. If the
bureaucrat can endogenously generate red tape then the eﬃciency result no longer
holds. The bureaucrat (or politician, or rapacious government) then increases red tape
in order to generate rents that can be extracted by demanding appropriate bribes.
Myrdal pointed to this tendency, and the consequences of rent-seeking behavior has
been explicated by Krueger (1974) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993), among
others. In general endogenous red tape raises the cost of the service to applicants,
so that those applicants who have a lower valuation for the service drop out of the
market, reducing welfare (Bose, 2004). Saha (2001) analyses the distribution of rents
from varying levels of red tape between heterogeneous agents. Djankov, La Porta,
de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and Kaufman and Wei (1999) report from separate
empirical studies that high levels of regulation correlate positively with high corruption.
Some of the papers cited above construct models of red tape with varying degrees
of sophistication, but the focus of this literature can be captured in a simple concep-
tual model. Suppose diﬀerent applicants have diﬀerent valuations for the service and
diﬀerent costs of suﬀering red tape. Suppose also that there is no distinction made be-
tween an agent’s private valuation of the good and the social welfare generated when
the good is allocated to the corresponding agent, and that agents are able to pay up
to the extent of their valuation for the good.
When red tape is exogenous and the bureaucrat can reduce it at some (possibly
zero) cost, he constructs a schedule of diﬀerent bribe payments and associated levels
of red tape to maximise his bribe income. This is a familiar problem of contracting
under imperfect information. If the bureaucrat can choose the level of red tape, he
constructs such a schedule for each possible exogenous level of red tape and calculates
the associated bribe income for each level. He then chooses that default level of red
tape which maximises his income, and oﬀers the associated schedules.6 Conditions can
then be derived under which the optimum levels of red tape exceed or falls short of
those determined by institutional parameters.
This is an agency problem between the government (principal) and the bureaucrat
(agent). Given the agency problem, the constrained optimum can be attained by
privatising the sale of the service, if possible competitively through several providers,
and instituting appropriate tax/subsidy policies and/or eﬃciency-wage schemes.7
Thus there is no clear reason why the service needs to be provided directly by the
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publicly provided. In particular, if wasteful red tape is speciﬁcally a characteristic of
public (but not private) provision, then provision should be privatised, as suggested by
the “eﬃcient corruption” literature. This argument is made by Banerjee (1997) and
echoed in Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullianathan (2009), and provides the motivation for
the alternative framework that is considered in the next section.
3.2 Red tape with an allocation function
Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullianathan (2009) propose a framework which departs from
the one above in two respects. The focus is again on a service provided by the govern-
ment to members of a heterogeneous population. However, the private valuation of a
prospective recipient may diverge from the value society places on the receipt of the
service by that recipient. Further, the ability-to-pay of the recipient may also diverge
from his willingness-to-pay.
Private and social valuations may diﬀer in cases such as driving licenses and building
permits. There is no a priori reason why a bad driver should value a license any
less than a good one, but the former poses a greater potential threat to safety. An
applicant with a faulty building plan may similarly value a permit as much as one
with a structurally sound plan, but poses a hazard were the building to be built. To
take another example, societies that care about equity and equal opportunity would
prefer to allot free hospital beds and tuition scholarships upon the less aﬄuent, but if
health-care and education can be bought on the market then value of an allotment is
independent of the recipient’s wealth.
Continuing the last example, suppose aspirants to higher education have two attributes—
academic ability and wealth, and further suppose that individuals are credit constrained
and hence cannot pay more than their current wealth as payment for a higher educa-
tion slot.8 The private value of a higher education slot to an individual is measured
by the extent to which the individual’s earning ability will increase due to education,
and hence is higher for those with high ability. The individual’s willingness-to-pay is
given by this value, but his ability-to-pay is constrained by wealth. If some high ability
aspirant is severely wealth-constrained, then he may well be outbid by a low-ability
agent who is less wealth-constrained. If the distribution of education slots were pri-
vatised, or otherwise made to the highest bidder, then allocation will necessarily be
ineﬃcient. Further, as we will see, it is possible to attain a more eﬃcient allocation
that necessarily requires the use of red tape.
In this discussion, an important distinction has to be made between two cases:
one in which the service is not scarce, but for reasons of social welfare should only be
allocated to qualiﬁed individuals (e.g., driving licenses). The second is the case where
a limited quantity of the service is available, and should be ﬁrst distributed to agents
where it generates greater social value (e.g., publicly funded higher education places).
We shall call the ﬁrst type of service a “license”, and the second a “slot”. Here we
focus on slots. Guriev (2004) analyses a model in which the service is better described
as a licence.
Below, I describe a simpliﬁed framework, based loosely on Banerjee (1997) and
Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullianathan (2009), within which such allocation problems can
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The economy consists of the government, bureaucrats that dispense the service, and
a large number of potential applicants. Each applicant is described by three attributes,
and for simplicity we allow each attribute to take one of two values. V is the social
value of his being allocated the service, V ∈{ H,L},H> L . v is his private valuation
of the service, and y is his ability to pay. We refer to individuals with V = H>0a s
the “high” types and V = L as the “low” types.
The government sets some guidelines for the provision of the service. The bureaucrat—
in return for a bribe—may contravene the guidelines in dispensing the service to indi-
vidual applicants. Clearly, if the government has no means to check the performance
of the bureaucrat, then it cannot design mechanisms to inﬂuence allocation in the di-
rection of the social optimum. At least two simple mechanisms may be considered.
First, the applicant may be required to undertake tests that provide a signal on type,
and it is costly for the bureaucrat to falsify a test report to the government. Alterna-
tively, the government may be able to ex post s a m p l ea n do b t a i na ne s t i m a t eo ft h e
type-composition of the successful applicants.
Suppose there is a unit measure of slots that must be allocated among a population
of measure N>1. Type H applicants constitute a measure NH < 1, and type L the
remaining N − NH. The objective of the government is to maximise social welfare,
thus it would like to allocate scarce slots to high types ﬁrst. Assume H>L>0, thus
any remaining slots should be allocated to the low types.9
Let private valuations and ability-to-pay be determined by type, so all high types
have value vH and ability-to-pay yH ≤ vH, while low types have vL and yL ≤ vL.T h i s
provides a 2x2 typology {vH >v L,v H ≤ vL}×{ yH >y L,y H ≤ yL}. Some salient
points emerge from the analysis about the problem of optimal design in such a context,
as well as potential allocations, corruption and red tape in equilibrium.
The most important observation is that non-market allocation mechanisms are nec-
essary to improve social welfare precisely in the case of goods or services for which there
is a divergence between social and private valuations, or a divergence between ability
and willingness to pay. Hence these are the arenas in which government needs to step
in and make rules. Secondly, in many of the cases, improved allocation requires the
imposition of non-pecuniary costs upon applicants, which we have labeled “red tape”.
Thirdly, when the government has some control, but imperfect control over the bu-
reaucrat, the latter may impose additional red tape to facilitate bribe income. In most
cases, increased red tape is associated with increased corruption. However, the exis-
tence of red tape also indicates that the mechanism is at least partially successful in
combating corruption and improving allocation, compared to the outcome that would
be obtained if the distribution of the service were fully privatised.
To see the intuition behind the results consider the following variation of the model.
First let vH = H>L= vL, i.e., private and social valuations are equal. Suppose each
applicant is rich with probability α and poor with probability 1 − α. Rich applicants
have wealth yR ≥ vH while the poor have wealth yP ≤ vL. Social optimum requires
that all NH high-value individuals get slots, while the remaining 1 − NH slots be
distributed among the low-value ones. This allocation cannot be implemented through
pure market means, since the cash price q of slots cannot exceed yP if the high-value
poor are to be included, and at this price everyone will apply. An additional non-price
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by instituting some pure-waste red tape as a prerequisite for priority allocation of slots;
those who refuse to suﬀer red tape go into a lottery for the slots that remain after the
priority allocations are made.
Let q be the cash price, and t the cost of red tape that is instituted. High-value ap-
plicants must prefer to suﬀer red tape and get slots for sure, while low-value applicants
must prefer to pay only the cash price and get slots with probability 1−NH
NL . Only those
who are allocated slots are required to pay the cash price and suﬀer any associated red
tape. The respective conditions are:






≥ vL − (q + t)
which reduce to the condition:
(N − 1)(vH − q) ≥ NLt ≥ (N − 1)(vL − q)






(vH − q)] (1)
so for any q ≤ yP there is a corresponding interval of values for t that will produce the
desired outcome. Let T(q) denote the interval on the right-hand-side of (1). Since red
tape has a cost, it is eﬃcient to set t at the left-hand boundary of T(q). Note that the
interval T(q) shifts down as q increases.10
Now suppose the relevant bureaucrat is corrupt, but he cannot deviate from the
eﬃcient allocation of slots because the government samples the successful applicants
and gets a reliable estimate of the proportions in which they are allocated, and the
bureaucrat is penalised suﬃciently severely if this proportion deviates from the eﬃcient
one.
The bureaucrat can nevertheless collect bribes by changing the mechanism in the
following ways. Let q  be the government-mandated cash price, and q the price that
the bureaucrat actually institutes.
First, if q  <y P he can set q = yP and ask for a bribe of b1 = q−q  across the board
in return for lowering red tape from minT(q )t om i nT(q). Secondly, he may ask for
an additional bribe of b2 =m i nT(q) to eliminate red tape altogether for applicants in
the priority category. Rich high-value applicants would be willing to pay the bribe,
while the poor ones choose to suﬀer red tape.
Thirdly, he can raise the level of red tape to maxT(q) ,a n da s kf o ra na d d i t i o n a l
bribe of b3 =m a xT(q)−minT(q) to reduce this additional red tape, which high-value
rich applicants will again be willing to pay, while high-value poor applicants suﬀer extra
red tape. In this last mechanism he reaps (q − q ) from the unit measure of successful
applicants, plus maxT(q)f r o mt h eαNH high-value rich applicants. Setting q = yP,
this gives a proﬁt of




Let the welfare generated by an allocation mechanism be the (possibly weighted)
sum of individual net payoﬀs from the allocation process. A recipient’s net payoﬀ is
11his valuation net of any bribe he pays, minus the cost of the red tape he suﬀers. The
bureaucrats net payoﬀ is the sum of the bribes he receives. Thus bribes are a transfer,
and do not aﬀect welfare unless payoﬀs are diﬀerentially weighted.
If the welfare of all agents (including bureaucrats) are weighted equally, then the
ﬁrst method of collecting bribes is welfare neutral. The second method may increase
welfare since high-value rich applicants do not suﬀer red tape, while the last one is
welfare decreasing. However, note that in all three cases the existence of red tape
signals that some social objectives are being achieved; if the social beneﬁt from al-
locating the slots were not a concern then revenue-maximising market mechanisms
could be designed which require no red tape, and in which allocations are made in
decreasing order of priority to high-value rich, low-value rich, and poor applicants. A
rapacious bureaucrat could reap at least as much bribe income, and typically more, as
under the scenario discussed above, since he is not constrained to allocate in optimal
proportions.11
In the above we have not dealt with licenses, where the problem is to deny applicants
who have social value L<0. In a related paper, Guriev (2004) explores the case
where vL > 0 but L<0, and the bureaucrat’s job is to test applicants and award
licenses to only the high types. The amount of testing is a choice variable; high
types always pass tests while low types fail with greater probability as the number
of tests is increased. The bureaucrat may accept a bribe to reduce the number of
tests, or to falsely report a “pass” when an applicant has failed the test. Clearly the
red tape (testing) is necessary here to distinguish types, it turns out that when the
possibility of corruption is admitted, the equilibrium level of red tape always exceeds
the optimal level. It is again important to note that red tape in equilibrium signals
that the mechanism at least partly attains its objective—without any constraints the
bureaucrat would simply sell licenses without regard to recipient types at a monopoly
price, and there would be no red tape.
4 Some consequences of rent-seeking
If private agents have an incentive to circumvent regulations, then enforcing those regu-
lations requires the use of real resources, which must be diverted away from production.
Thus regulation and enforcement is rational only when adherence to regulation create
social beneﬁts that outweigh the private costs of regulated agents. Optimal enforce-
ment must balance, at the margin, the beneﬁt to social welfare against the sum of the
private cost of compliance and the resource cost of enforcement. This reﬂects a funda-
mental and more general intuition of contract theory. When enforcers of regulations
are corruptible, there are additional costs of reducing corruption. In such cases, the
optimum will typically prescribe an outcome with some positive level of corruption,
rather than a complete absence of corruption.
Discussion of rent-seeking was initiated by Krueger (1974), and developed with
important early contributions including Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (1980) and
Bhagwati (1982). Here we focus on three aspects of rent-seeking. First, rent-seeking
on the part of corrupt bureaucrats can lead to a reduction of competition in product
markets, and result in a corresponding loss of social surplus. Secondly, rent-seeking
behaviour on the part of some agents reduce the incentive on the part of other agents
12to undertake productive activity by reducing their residual claims on the proceeds of
such undertakings. Thirdly, when bureaucrats that are charged with enforcing regu-
lations engage in rent-seeking, the optimal enforcement mechanism involves a larger
government sector—which draws labour away from productive activity—coupled with
higher wages for bureaucrats, which makes government employment comparatively
more attractive than entrepreneurial ventures even for agents with relatively greater
entrepreneurial ability.
4.1 Restricting competition
We draw upon Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) to elucidate two
aspects of the ﬁrst concern listed above. The context is a market in which ﬁrms need
to obtain licenses in order to produce and sell output.12 Licences are free, and licensed
ﬁrms sell output in a standard market where greater competition leads to greater social
surplus in the familiar textbook pattern. Potential ﬁrms have diﬀerent ﬁxed costs c
that are drawn from some known distribution F(c). All ﬁrms have identical variable
cost functions. In the absence of corruption, there is a cutoﬀ level of the ﬁxed cost
c∗ such that all ﬁrms with cost c ≤ c∗ enter the market, and the marginal ﬁrm with
c = c∗ earns zero proﬁt. Let n∗ = F(c∗).
Next suppose that there is a single bureaucrat that disburses the licenses, and this
bureaucrat is corrupt. He asks for some bribe B from each ﬁrm that requests a license.
Now in equilibrium the marginal ﬁrm must earn a pre-bribe proﬁt of B, which leads
to an equilibrium with a smaller number of ﬁrms, a higher market price, and some
loss of social surplus. The licensing cost B acts exactly like a lump-sum tax, and its
magnitude can be ﬁxed by solving the proﬁt-maximising problem of the bureaucrat.13
One way in which the government can avert corruption is by establishing multiple
licensing oﬃces each with an independent bureaucrat, and allow each ﬁrm to obtain
a license from any one of them. If bureaucrats compete in Bertrand fashion then
corruption can be eliminated at the cost of hiring one extra bureaucrat, as long as this
extra cost is justiﬁed by the corresponding gain in surplus. If they compete Cournot,
then a corresponding exercise will yield the optimal number of bureaucrats that should
be hired. Without further detail, Bertrand competition seems the natural assumption,
but further detail may well be critical in this regard.
A variation of the problem arises if each ﬁrm needs multiple licenses, say two.
Suppose the licenses are disbursed by two independent bureaucrats, each setting his
own bribe-price. Now Cournot competition seems natural, and again in equilibrium
the market surplus generated will fall short of the no-corruption case. Note that if the
bureaucrats could collude and thus charge a uniﬁed monopoly price, then in equilibrium
there would be more ﬁrms in the market than when they compete in Cournot fashion,
and there would be a smaller loss of surplus. This suggests that it may be socially
beneﬁcial, in the presence of corruption, to combine multiple licenses or permits needed
for a single venture in a “single window”.
4.2 Compromising property rights
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) explore the consequence of corruption on prop-
13erty rights. In their formulation, rent-seeking shows increasing relative returns in the
aggregate because an increase in rent-seeking behaviour reduces the security of prop-
erty and hence diminishes the expected returns to legitimate productive activity, thus
tilting the marginal choice between productive activity and rent-seeking in favour of
the latter. Agents can engage in one of three activities: production with a high-return
technology that produces a marketed output, production with a low-return technology
that produces a self-consumed output, and rent-seeking that appropriates part of the
producers’ returns from the marketed output. Individually, each activity is subject to
diminishing returns. However, each producer’s expected net payoﬀ from the market
activity declines as the number of rent-seekers increases. With appropriate parame-
ter values, the economy possesses multiple stable equilibria; in the worst equilibrium
agents distribute themselves between the three activities and the returns to each agent
is driven down to the level of the low-productivity activity. If rent-seeking is inter-
preted as corruption, then this equilibrium corresponds to a erosion of property rights
to the extent that no producer has an incentive to switch to occupations with higher
productivity.
A diﬀerent aspect of the link between corruption and the erosion of property rights
is explored in Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), who focus on the allocation of talent
between productive and bureaucratic activities. Agents have diﬀerent levels of talent
in productive activities, which are reﬂected in their ﬁxed costs of setting up produc-
tion. Agents that choose to produce ﬁnd themselves equally divided between upstream
and downstream activities, and each upstream producer is paired with a downstream
producer. An upstream producer can invest in superior technology which improves
the probability that his downstream partner will produce a high-value output. The
investment cannot be veriﬁed, thus incentive contracts for the supply of inputs must
be made contingent on the realised value of the downstream output. The downstream
producer has an incentive to falsify this value when good output has been produced,
thus these contracts need to be enforced by the legal mechanism acting through the
bureaucrat.
However, bureaucrats may be corrupt and hence willing to ratify a false report in
exchange for a bribe. This reduces output (upstream producers are no longer willing to
invest) so the government would ﬁnd it optimal to curtail corruption. Corrupt bureau-
crats are caught with some probability and lose both the bribe and their wage; hence
the government can provide an incentive for them to be honest by paying a higher (eﬃ-
ciency) wage. However, this increases the attractiveness of jobs in the bureaucracy, and
hence draws relatively talented agents away from production. Acemoglu and Verdier
(1998) show that it is possible over some ranges of bureaucratic wages for there to be a
“free lunch”; the increased contract enforcement produces better incentives to invest,
and as a result total output increases with bureaucratic compensation. However, in
general it is optimal not to enforce perfect property rights because this requires wages
that are too high and therefore drain more talented agents from the private sector.
4.3 Diverting resources from production into enforcement
The tradeoﬀ between reducing corruption and devoting resources to production is in-
vestigated by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). In their model the government employs
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produces a positive externality. Bureaucrats become unavailable for productive activ-
ity. I present a simpliﬁed version of the model below in some detail.14
There is a unit measure of agents in the economy, of which a fraction 1 − n are
hired by the government as bureaucrats to enforce regulations, and earn a wage w.T h e
remaining fraction n become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can use a “bad” technology
which costs nothing, or a “good” technology that has a non-pecuniary cost of c. Both
technologies produce output y, but the good technology produces an additional non-
pecuniary externality β for each agent in the economy. Let a measure x ≤ n of the
entrepreneurs use the good technology, then each entrepreneur obtains a net proﬁt of
y + βx if he uses the bad technology, and y + βx− c if he uses the good technology.15
The government aims to maximise social welfare. To provide incentive to use the
good technology, the government oﬀers a subsidy of s to the entrepreneurs who do
so, and levies a tax (penalty) of τ on those that do not. The penalty cannot exceed
the entrepreneurs net proﬁt (otherwise compliance could be enforced using very few
bureaucrats and a very high penalty). Taxes and subsidies are assessed only on en-
trepreneurs who are identiﬁed as using the corresponding technology. To this purpose,
each bureaucrat audits exactly one entrepreneur. Assuming n ≥ 1
2, the probability of
being audited is 1−n
n . Those entrepreneurs that are audited are given the subsidy or
levied the tax, the rest only receive their net proﬁt as described earlier.
If bureaucrats are corrupt, then they can threaten to misreport a compliant en-
trepreneur, who would then suﬀer a loss of (s + τ). Correspondingly, he could oﬀer to
misreport a non-compliant entrepreneur who would then gain the same amount. In ei-
ther case, therefore, the corrupt bureaucrat asks for a bribe to report the entrepreneur
as compliant. Assume this bribe is a given fraction σ of the threat. Bureaucrats that
accept a bribe are caught with some exogenous probability φ, and lose their bribe
σ(s+τ) plus the wage. With probability 1−φ they keep both the wage and the bribe.
Honest bureaucrats only earn the wage. Thus a higher wage translates into a larger
expected penalty for being corrupt.
While the model appears speciﬁc (e.g., environmental regulations), it can readily
be reinterpreted to cover a variety of contexts. For example, c may be the income tax
owed by the entrepreneur, which is then used by the government to provide public
goods that generate a positive beneﬁt to each citizen. Tax-evaders that are caught are
punished with a ﬁne. Note that it is the net incentive s+τ that matters, and in this case
s = 0. Tax-inspectors who collected bribes from both compliant and non-compliant
citizens have been reported in Klitgaard (1988) in the context of the Philippines. For
detailed discussion of corruption in tax administrations, both theoretical and empirical,
see Mookherjee (1997) and Dasgupta and Mookherjee (1998).
The instruments at the government’s disposal include the parameters s and τ of
the tax-subsidy scheme, the size of the government sector (1 − n), and the wage paid
to the bureaucrats, w. s and τ determine the entrepreneurs incentives, (1 − n)ﬁ x e s
the allocation of labour resources between production and enforcement, and w deter-
mines the incentive of the bureaucrats to be honest. Solving the system requires four
conditions, of which two are immediately obvious; the penalty τ must be set at the
maximum feasible value y, and the net proceeds of the tax-subsidy scheme must cover
bureaucrats wages. The remaining two equations follow from the incentive constraints
15of the entrepreneurs and bureaucrats respectively.
Since the relevant payoﬀ functions are linear in x, and all entrepreneurs are identical,
in equilibrium they will all adopt the same technology. If this is the bad technology
then the government is better oﬀ not enforcing at all, hence our interest lies in the
equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose the good technology. Implementing this
equilibrium is worthwhile only when the gain from the externality is large enough to
oﬀset the cost of diverting resources to the government sector, thus the government
will enforce compliance only when the externality β is suﬃciently high.
First suppose that bureaucrats are incorruptible. Then the expected gain of an
entrepreneur from choosing the good technology instead of the bad is 1−n
n (s + τ) − c,
which must be non-negative, and at the optimum is set to zero. This gives




Bureaucrats’ wages must match entrepreneurs’ incomes (exactly, an the optimum),
which gives




These two additional conditions determine the optimum, and ﬁx the proportion of
agents that the government hires as bureaucrats.
Next suppose bureaucrats are potentially corrupt. We are still looking for the
equilibrium in which there is full compliance, so no bribes are paid and hence the en-
trepreneurs’ incentive condition continues to be given by (2). However, the bureaucrats
wage must now be set so that the payoﬀ from remaining honest, w, is at least as large
as the expected payoﬀ from being corrupt. Recall the corrupt bureaucrat’s expected








w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e df o r( s + τ) from (2). If the probability of detection is suﬃ-
ciently low, then this requires a wage higher than when bureaucrats are incorruptible.
In that case, the optimum prescribes a higher wage, as well as a larger measure of
bureaucrats, which relaxes the no-corruption constraint by reducing the net subsidy
(s+τ) in (2). Thus implementing the regulation with corruptible bureaucrats is more
costly in terms of the resources it drains away from the productive sector. It also fol-
lows that the threshold beneﬁt β that makes it worthwhile to implement the regulation
is now higher.
In the equilibria above, all bureaucrats remain honest because agents are homoge-
neous. To obtain an equilibrium with partial corruption we need some heterogeneity.
Suppose that some bureaucrats are better at hiding bribes than others, so that the
probability of detection is diﬀerent for the two groups. Then it is possible to ﬁnd an
equilibrium in which the bureaucrats with the higher probability of detection remain
honest, while the rest collect bribes.
The primary intuition is that, when bureaucrats are corrupt, high-powered incen-
tives for compliance generate greater bribe opportunities and bureaucrats must be paid
higher wages to induce them to remain honest. At the margin it is optimal to reduce
16compliance incentives (and hence bureaucratic salaries), and compensate instead by in-
creasing the size of the bureaucracy which raises the probability that non-compliance
will be detected. If the probability of identifying and punishing corrupt bureaucrats
were endogenously determined by resources allocated to this end, then at the margin
more resources would also be spent in this direction. Thus the existence of corruption
makes for larger government and greater diversion of resources towards (intrinsically
unproductive) enforcement activity. As a consequence, governments in countries more
prone to corruption will only enforce compliance that generate greater positive exter-
nalities. For example, it has often been noted that in India the income-tax base is
narrow, because the minimum taxable level of income is high enough to exclude a large
mass of income earners. By the argument above, this may well be the optimal structure
when the cost of enforcing compliance is taken into account.
A further critical observation, which echoes a point made in connection with red
tape, is that enforcement is only warranted in cases where the neoclassical model of
the private market fails to allocate resources optimally. If the beneﬁts from compliance
were private, then individual incentives or Coasian contracting would be suﬃcient to
ensure optimality without government intervention.
5 Intermediaries in corruption markets
In the preceding sections we focused on markets where there is a clear rationale for
the government to be involved in distribution, and hence bureaucratic involvement
is inevitable. Bureaucrats utilised their special position in the process to potentially
collect bribes, or to be compensated above market in order to be given incentives not
to do so. We did not pay much attention to the process of corruption; it was implicitly
assumed that bribes are handed directly to the bureaucrat by members of the public.
This is clearly a drastic simpliﬁcation of the process. While direct bribes may be
common in very petty corruption (e.g., paying a parking inspector to avoid a ticket, or
a traﬃc policeman to allow a loaded truck past a “no trucks” sign), they are unlikely to
constitute a major portion of the total value of bribes. For example, it is Oldenburg’s
(1987) opinion that “...[I]t is likely that corruption transactions involving only two
actors, although perhaps the most numerous...are not the most signiﬁcant.” Similarly,
Lambsdorﬀ (2002, p.222) thinks “...corrupt agreements are more likely to employ mid-
dlemen or result as a by-product of legal exchange...” In very few government oﬃces
would one actually pay a bribe at the oﬃcial window that accepts or dispenses an
application. Most bureaucratic corruption is channeled through intermediaries—touts,
front men, lawyers, consultants, facilitators, and various others.
In the typical instance of corruption, a public oﬃcial allows a private agent a
privilege which that agent is legally not entitled to, in return for a payment in cash
or kind. The oﬃcial may also delay or withhold a service the agent is entitled to,
unless a consideration is paid. Quick service then becomes a privilege by default.
Corruption therefore requires the involvement of at least two parties—the oﬃcial and
the agent seeking the privilege—and necessitates agreement on a price. Every act of
corruption thus presupposes a market transaction. Standard reasons for the existence
of middlemen therefore apply, arising from arguments based on imperfect information,
economies of scale, contract enforcement, reputation eﬀects and so on.
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cannot conduct their search for trading partners publicly. This distinguishes it from
markets for everyday goods and renders information about potential partners more
diﬃcult to acquire, correspondingly making it more proﬁtable to specialise in the ac-
quisition and dissemination of such information. When we say that corruption is
”endemic” in a country, or in its police force or in its tax system, we mean that there is
a well-developed network of specialists or institutional processes that facilitate corrupt
transactions; as a consequence it is easy to locate potential partners and negotiate
prices, making the corruption channel an attractive and lower-cost alternative to le-
gal transactions. Agents therefore choose corrupt transactions over legal ones, in turn
ensuring that the intermediaries stay in business.
Intermediaries may sometimes amass signiﬁcant fortunes and inﬂuence, and actively
thwart attempts to change the laws and restrictions which agents circumvent using
corrupt transactions. This may mean that intermediaries lobby in favour of retaining
strict codes (e.g. building and safety codes); it may also mean that they oppose
rationalisation of outdated legislation and reduction of import duties. This is one
sense in which corruption ”undermines development by distorting the rule of law and
weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends”.16
It is surprising, therefore, that there are relatively few systematic studies of in-
termediaries in corruption activities. However, there are a few that are detailed and
insightful, and point towards an initial framework within which such activities may be
understood. Some of these are discussed in Subsection 5.1. In Subsection 5.2 I draw
upon a number of contributions in an attempt to outline the roles that middlemen
fulﬁl, and brieﬂy review the (few) attempts at modeling middlemen.
5.1 Evidence of middlemen
In a perceptive study of the land consolidation process in Uttar Pradesh, Oldenburg
(1987) emphasises that, in order for mediators to be active in corruption, there must
be a strong prevailing belief that rank and ﬁle bureaucrats are, in fact, corrupt. Con-
versely, middlemen serve to strengthen this belief. It is signiﬁcant that Oldenburg
is discussing a process in which he found (somewhat unusually) very little evidence
of corruption. He concludes that this is because land consolidation was an open and
transparent process where decisions were made in participative meetings between all
concerned farmers and were subject to unanimous agreement. Further, there were no
government funds to be disbursed. However, there was widespread belief that there was
substantial corruption, and that money had been paid to ensure that farmers got fair
allocations. He argues that traditional intermediaries, who anticipated that outcomes
would be fair, convinced “clients” that intercessions on their behalf was necessary to en-
sure fairness, and that bribes had to be paid. The clients in turn believed this because
corruption was the norm in their other dealings with the bureaucracy. Farmers who
paid “bribes” to the intermediaries, and then in fact received fair allocations, believed
that the bribes had been instrumental. Intermediaries often promised to return the
money if results were not achieved.17 Reliance on middlemen was thought necessary
to convey the bribes because middlemen enjoyed privileged access to oﬃcials, whether
because of contact through other (lawful) dealings or owing to caste or kinship ties.
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hierarchical structure of corruption in the distribution of canal water for irrigation in
a South Indian state. Huge sums of money were paid as kickbacks to the irrigation
department by contractors who received construction contracts, and as bribes by agri-
cultural users of irrigation water. Farmers paid bribes to ensure that they received
their entitlements, as well as to obtain more than their entitlement, for example, be-
cause they grew crops that their land was not zoned for. Wade does not explicitly
mention middlemen, but he does indicate that the actual payments were usually made
by water-users not to oﬃcials but to the private contractors, and contractors often
held this money, as well as the kickbacks they themselves paid, in trust for the corrupt
oﬃcials of the irrigation department. Wade writes:
The [Assistant Engineer] may tell the Supervisor to ask the farmers to pay
the money directly to a named contractor, or the Supervisor may take the
money and immediately pass it to the contractor. The only person with
any money (evidence) on his hands is thus the contractor. If by chance he
should be investigated by the police and large sums of money found in his
possession he can say he has taken out loans for his works (p.297).
The executive engineer lends money to contractors
...not primarily to get the interest, but to have the very large amount of
money he collects each year held not in his own hands...and not all in a
bank...but in the hands of people over whom he has tight control...[H]e
lends them money to do the works, they present him with their bills, he
(legitimately) encashes the bills at the bank and pays them and then directs
the contractors what to do with ‘his’ portion of the funds (p.294).
The chain continues up,
When...the Minister calls for money, the [Executive Engineer] may tell one
of his banker-contractors to pay the Minister’s agent (the Minister too never
touches the money...) (p.295).
Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullianathan (2007) report on a more recent study
of corruption in the issue of drivers’ licences in Delhi. The study is a ﬁeld experiment,
and directly addresses the role of middlemen. The investigators oﬀered each member
of one group of licence applicants a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial reward for obtaining a licence
within a speciﬁed time(“bonus” group), while another group of applicants was given free
driving lessons (“lesson” group). A third group was given no external stimulus. Thus
the bonus group was better placed to oﬀer bribes, while the lesson group was arguably
better qualiﬁed as drivers. The experimenters independently tested applicants after
the process to assess their ability to drive, and collected information on the process of
obtaining licences.
There was evidence of systematic and widespread corruption in the process. The
payment of bribes signiﬁcantly increased the likelihood of obtaining a licence, often
without the candidate having to take a driving test, and even when the independent
test showed inadequate ability to drive. An interesting ﬁnding is that, of drivers who
took a driving test once before resorting to extra-legal channels, about 35% failed
the test, and “this percentage is unrelated to to actual ability to drive...it is constant
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authors continue, “This interpretation is consistent with theories of ‘endogenous red
tape,’ which emphasize that many bureaucratic hurdles might be the result of rent-
seeking activities by bureaucrats...”. There is good support for the hypothesis that
bureaucrats randomly fail test-takers (and this is known) so that aspirants are induced
to seek the help of agents.
Most relevant in context is the ﬁnding that bribes are not paid directly to bureau-
crats, but channeled through “agents”, who act in a private capacity to facilitate the
obtaining of licences. The authors are of the opinion that “agents institutionalize cor-
ruption.” By and large, licence aspirants that hired agents did not need to take the
driving test, while most of those that did not hire agents took the test. Indeed, drivers
regardless of their ability used agents to save time, avoid harassment, and ensure re-
sults. On the other side of the table, all bribes were paid to agents, no communication
relating to bribes is reported to have occurred directly with bureaucrats.
5.2 Functions of middlemen
From the accounts above, we can deduce two immediate reasons for the salience of
intermediaries in corruption. Bureaucrats may act through intermediaries because it
oﬀers them some protection from being identiﬁed as corrupt, and from the correspond-
ing criminal consequences. Since bureaucrats will not identify themselves, members
of the public rely on middlemen to make the connection with corrupt bureaucrats,
whether it is to be illegally granted a service, or to avoid harassment in the process
of legally obtaining one. Middlemen may of course pose as “agents” or “consultants”
who legally collect fees for their services; the transfer to the bureaucrat is a clandestine
transaction between trusted parties and hence less vulnerable to detection.
There are further reasons why a person may use a middleman rather than directly
approach the bureaucrats. Very often the applicant does not need the service repeat-
edly. A person may apply for a driver’s licence or a building permit only once in a
lifetime. It may take signiﬁcant eﬀort to ﬁnd out who needs to be bribed, and how
much, since bureaucrats cannot advertise. Middlemen can discuss prices and options at
length. It is in the middleman’s interest to collect information on corrupt bureaucrats
and ascertain how much they can deliver at what price, since this information functions
as the middleman’s capital. Besides, an individual who directly bribes a bureaucrat
cannot ensure that the service will be rendered, and may have little recourse if it is not.
The middleman, as the conduit for a steady stream of bribe income, can on the other
hand be reasonably conﬁdent that the bureaucrat will deliver results (see Lambsdorﬀ,
2002, p.230 for a discussion of reputation in this context).
Hasker and Okten (2008) analyse a model that assumes that intermediaries have a
greater ability to enforce contracts, and bureaucrats have less chance of being caught
when they accept bribes through intermediaries. Thus accepting bribes from an in-
termediary is safer for the bureaucrat, but he has to reciprocate (e.g., to protect his
reputation with the intermediary), though he may not deliver after taking a direct
bribe. There is a single (monopolist) bureaucrat and a large number of clients. The
bureaucrat administers a regulation which he may reduce to a lower level in return for
a bribe. The regulation is costly to clients. They may bribe the bureaucrat directly
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tive. The paper ﬁnds that the use of intermediaries increases with the bureaucrat’s
expected punishment from taking an unmediated bribe, and when intermediaries are
used in equilibrium the quality of regulation enforcement is lower than if there were no
intermediaries. Further, in a market where no intermediaries are present, increasing
expected punishment and reducing bureaucrat’s discretion improves regulation enforce-
ment, but in the presence of intermediaries these measures are less eﬀective, and may
in fact reduce regulation enforcement.
The information-brokering role is modeled in Bayar (2005). She posits a situation
in which some bureaucrats are honest and some are corrupt. Clients are willing to
pay bribes to avoid red tape which is imposed by corrupt bureaucrats, but do not
know which bureaucrats are corrupt. Nor do they know the reservation bribe-prices
of the corrupt bureaucrats. Clients are caught and penalised if they oﬀer bribes to
honest bureaucrats. Middlemen, when they exist, invest in collecting information about
corrupt bureaucrats and their reservation prices. The authors ﬁnd that clients are best
oﬀ when bureaucrats set red tape at a low level (i.e., do not try to extract bribes). If
corruption is present, then clients are better oﬀ when intermediaries are active than
when they are not. However, the presence of intermediaries itself encourages greater
corruption.
Middlemen may also serve a screening function. In Bertrand et. al. (2007), ap-
plicants that went to the oﬃcial window waited a much longer time, had to visit the
licence oﬃce more often, and went through more testing procedures than did appli-
cants who went through an agent. This immediately recalls the formulation based on
Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullianathan (2009) that was elaborated in Section 3.2, where
bureaucrats sorted agents with diﬀerent abilities to pay by imposing diﬀerent levels of
red tape. Applicants self-select across the menu by choosing one access or the other.
Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009) analyse a queuing model in which some bureaucrats
are honest and some are corrupt. Correspondingly some clients have valid claims to
the service being distributed (say a conditional subsidy) while others do not. Valid
applications cannot be denied by either type of bureaucrat, but corrupt bureaucrats will
also dispense the service against a (Nash-bargaining determined) bribe. A monopolist
middleman learns the nature of each bureaucrat, and for a fee direct clients with valid
and invalid applications to appropriate bureaucrats. Invalid clients place obvious value
on this information, but valid clients value it as well because the waiting times are
longer at the oﬃces of corrupt bureaucrats, and time has value. In equilibrium, the
fee charged from valid applicants is zero, while invalid applicants pay a positive fee.
The existence of the middleman unequivocally reduces social welfare, as well as the
expected utility of valid applicants.
Finally, when there are several bureaucrats involved in a process, a well-organised
intermediary can coordinate their bribe demands and increase the total bribe-income.
The middleman then serves as the organiser of a cartel. In hierarchical government
departments that are steeped in corruption, as in Wade’s canal irrigation study, there
is usually one point of contact between the department and members of the public.
Without such organisation each oﬃcial in any position to extract a bribe would make his
own demand uncoordinated with others (as in familiar examples of cartel instability)
leading to an outcome that is ineﬃcient for the department as a whole, and quite
21possibly ineﬃcient from a social point of view as well.
In Section 4.1 we outlined a simple model in which an applicant needs two licenses
for which he applies simultaneously. If the two bureaucrats set bribes in Cournot
fashion, they reap less revenue than if they formed a cartel, and social welfare is also
lower. In such a market, a middleman who serves as an agent for a continuous stream
of such applicants could promise each bureaucrat his Cournot equilibrium bribe income
and cartelise the market.
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Majumdar, and Radner (2009) analyse a problem in which
licences have to be obtained in sequence from several bureaucrats in order to undertake
a project. Each applicant contemplates a project only once, but in this dynamic
model new applicants appear in every period. This creates a holdup problem, and
in the absence of middlemen in equilibrium, no project is undertaken with positive
probability. They then introduce a middleman who is a long-term player, and can
mediate applications from the entire sequence of applicants. This replaces a sequence
of one-shot games with an inﬁnitely repeated game, and hence by established results
produces new equilibria in which some projects are in fact undertaken with positive
probability.
It is possible that, in a static, partial equilibrium framework, the existence of es-
tablished intermediaries will increase corruption, and simultaneously increase social
welfare. Middlemen may save time and cost by providing ready access to informa-
tion about corrupt bureaucrats and measures to slash red tape, which may more than
compensate for welfare losses from increased corruption. Khanna and Johnston (2007)
have argues that intermediaries serve various socio-psychological purposes: they give
the interface between government and public a human dimension, reduce transactions
costs, restore self-respect to bureaucrats and reaﬃrm oﬃcial status.
An aspect of intermediation that is more diﬃcult to capture in simple microeco-
nomic models is that the presence of professional intermediaries may render it much
more diﬃcult to combat or reduce corruption in the long run. Intermediaries have an
entrenched stake in corruption, and unlike bureaucrats cannot be bought oﬀ by eﬃ-
ciency wages. Some of them may amass signiﬁcant fortunes, and get into positions that
inﬂuence policy-making and electoral behaviour. While this may not be true for petty
intermediaries, it has periodically emerged as a concern in Indian politics. As Bertrand
et. al. aver, intermediaries “institutionalize corruption,” and in recent decades we have
come to believe that, once conceived, institutions have a life and a resilience of their
own that is not sensitive to marginal incentives.
It may be worthwhile exploring whether structural characteristics that explain as-
pects of underdevelopment may also be responsible for the occurrence of corruption,
and the profusion of intermediaries in that market. Considerable microeconomic in-
sights have been gained in recent decades into the causal connections between poverty
and inequality, credit constraints, and aspects of underdevelopment. Coordination
failure has also been identiﬁed a likely explanation for the persistence of some charac-
teristics of underdevelopment. These may well be capable of shedding insight into the
existence and structure of corruption as well.
As an illustration, consider the paper by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) dis-
cussed at the beginning of Section 4.2. This is a model with multiple equilibria, where
one of the equilibria displays substantial rent-seeking. But now suppose that undertak-
22ing production using the high-return technology requires some capital, and agents in
this economy face various degrees of credit and wealth constraints. Then we can gen-
erate a conﬁguration where only a rent-seeking equilibrium exists when many agents
are credit-constrained, but a superior equilibrium appears once these constraints are
suﬃciently relaxed. For example, resourceful agents who act as intermediaries when
they are credit constrained may well move into productive activities when they are not.
Alternatively, if agents could use capital to counteract rent-seeking behaviour on the
part of others (as in contest models such as Grossman and Kim (1995) or Hirshleifer
(1995)), then a relaxation of credit constraints could lead to the disappearance of the
bad equilibrium. Explanations that draw on inequality and market constraints would
bring the analysis of corruption closer to the mainstream of contemporary development
microeconomics.
6 Conclusion
In this essay I have attempted to draw selectively from the theoretical literature on
corruption in developing countries to outline certain aspects of the problem that have
received relatively less attention and merit further analysis. In Section 3 I have em-
phasised contributions that try to explain patterns of corruption from attributes that
are speciﬁc to developing economies. In Section 4 I have outlined contributions that
explore externalities created by corruption, that would go unremarked in studies that
concentrate on the individual exchange between bureaucrat and client. Finally in Sec-
tion 5 I have reviewed the few contributions on corruption market-makers, a category
that has been largely ignored in the literature (though not in the popular press).
This selection of material is driven by the belief that eﬀective analyses of corruption
must address the industrial organisation of the market in which corrupt services are
traded. Further they must be rooted in essential characteristics of underdevelopment,
on the one hand, and connect with causes of continued underdevelopment, on the
other. It seems unlikely that analysis which does not incorporate these strictures can
shed light on the kind of corruption we have in mind, which is exclusively a developing
country phenomenon; Petty bureaucratic corruption is rarely a problem in developed
economies.
The emphasis of this paper has been on analysing the mechanics of speciﬁc types
of corruption, rather than on devising mechanisms to control corruption. However,
various context-speciﬁc policy instruments have been suggested in appropriate places.
In allocation mechanisms of the type addressed in Section 3, we pointed out that
sampling the recipients of the service is an eﬀective way to attain second-best outcomes,
and that the existence of red tape itself indicates that some welfare objectives are being
achieved. In various places in Section 4 we pointed out the virtues of single-window
processing, low-powered incentives in the form of eﬃciency wages, and enforcement
sectors that are larger than the ﬁrst-best size. These emerge as piecemeal remedies for
speciﬁc problems, but much of the underlying intuition generalises easily to an array
of similar problems.
There are several microeconomic studies of corruption, both theoretical and em-
pirical, only a fraction of which have been discussed here. However, only a very small
number of these recognise the existence of intermediaries in corruption. In this essay
23I have devoted a signiﬁcant amount of space to this phenomenon precisely because
I feel this to be a serious omission. As indicated in the preceding section, attempts
to model intermediaries in corruption have been few and sporadic, and the dividends
are not yet spectacular. There is of course a substantial literature on intermediation
in legitimate markets that can shed some light on our concerns. But the corruption
market also has speciﬁc characteristics, as has been emphasised above, which are cru-
cial in shaping the equilibrium outcomes and their welfare consequences. Prominent
among these characteristics is the clandestine nature of the market, and the fact that
increased trade in the market, ceteris paribus, corresponds to a decrease in welfare.
Most existing papers have incorporated these characteristics somewhat superﬁcially
(if at all). However, these factors may well be critical in determining the industrial
organisation of corruption markets.
Earlier in this essay we underlined the need to distinguish between markets in which
government has reason to intervene, and hence corruption is a real problem, as opposed
to markets in which corruption could be eliminated with little social consequence by
privatising distribution. This explicit criterion for selecting material probably reveals
the most enduring policy presumption of this paper: if the market can adequately solve
an allocation problem, then the government should not intervene in it.
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1Bardhan’s comment indicates that causality may run from economic growth
to corruption, though Mauro explicitly adopts the opposite position.
2In a similar vein, in a study unrelated to corruption, Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
ﬁnd that diﬀerences in land tenure systems established in diﬀerent areas of British
India in the dim past robustly explain contemporary diﬀerences in agricultural
investment.
3The broader realisation that an alert press can hold government to its re-
sponsibilities is not new. In the work on famines by Sen and his associates, this
role of the press has been discussed frequently (see Ram, 1991, for an extended
discussion).
4The Right to Information Act enacted by the Indian Parliament in 2005 and
implemented by the states and territories enshrines this explicitly in law. The
eﬀectiveness of the act at present, and the ease with which relevant information
can be accessed under its provisions, is not clearly established. One would suspect
that in time specialist organisations will spring up that will mediate the work
of accessing information under the act, much as lawyers mediate the access to
justice. This would make the privileges guaranteed by the act more eﬀective, if
also more costly.
5Each person within a kin, caste, or linguistic group is expected to extend
favours to others in that group, and in turn relies on similar favours extended to
him.
6If all valuations are equal and the bureaucrat’s cost is zero, then he simply
sells the service with no red tape at the common value. If values are diﬀerent
but all agents place equal costs on suﬀering red tape, then again the bureaucrat
sells the good at a uniform monopoly price with no red tape.
7See the discussion in Aidt (2003) and the references therein, especially Becker
and Stigler (1974) and Mookherjee and Png (1995), for analyses of eﬃciency
wages and related measures in this context.
8Alternatively, they may face employment constraints, so while they have time
to wade through red tape, they are unable to convert this time into liquid funds
by working for a wage.
9If L<0 then the government would like to deny the service to the low types
altogether. If in addition the service is not scarce, then it ﬁts the description of
a license.
2510It also needs to be ensured that the aggregate cost of red tape is justiﬁed by
the welfare gain compared to a purely random allocation. This requires vH to be
high enough for given α; we assume this is true.
11One could construct a further mechanism in which the priority price is either
vL +m a xT(vL)w i t hn or e dt a p e ,o ryP plus red tape of (vL +m a xT(vL) − yP).
The non-priority price is either vL or yP with red tape vL − yP. Rich applicants
for each allocation category pay the ﬁrst price, and the poor pay the second.
However, since prices are paid only by those who obtain allocations, the low-
value poor must then suﬀer red tape after they have received an allocation in
the non-priority lottery. The context must determine whether this is a realistic
proposition.
12In keeping with our principal theme, we need a rationale for licensing that
in some way involves a market failure. Otherwise optimal policy would prescribe
that the licensing requirement be removed. An appropriate rationale may be
provided by the need to tax the ﬁrms to fund public goods that generate signiﬁ-
cant beneﬁts, or to enable the government to inspect health and safety measures
instituted by the ﬁrms.
13A referee has pointed out that this conclusion may need to be qualiﬁed; the
literature on informal sector and corruption shows that the total number of ﬁrms
may be higher in the presence of corruption.
14Ehrlich and Lui (1999) analyse the allocation of investment between produc-
tive and political capital in a dynamic model that is similar in spirit.
15β and c may be pecuniary quantities. This would complicate the algebra,
but the qualitative results remain unaﬀected.
16Quoted from the World Bank website titled “Anticorruption”, at http://
www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm.
17I was once told of a scam in which a “doctor” sold medicine that would
enable pregnant women to conceive a child of the desired sex, or their money
back. Half the treatments must have been successful. Many of course make an
oﬀering at temples for the same purpose, and half of those prayers are answered.
Hence we cannot convincingly argue that God herself is immune to being swayed
by a small consideration!
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